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Contemporary Left intellectuals--Marxists, postMarxistst 
democratic socialists; critical race theorists and feminist 
theorists--are generally uncertain about how to think about the 
nature of power even as they are often preoccupied with power's 
effects. Indeed, much of the debate on the Left about 
poststructuralism's political value turns on the question of 
power, but does so without theorizing power directly. Most neo- 
Marxist critiques of poststructuralism fault the latter either 
for being unpolitical and unscientific; the two criticisms 
converge on poststructuralism~s putative refusal of an extra- 
discursive reality and of law-like courses of events. In this 
reproach of poststructuralist critiques of ontological and 
epistemological objectivity, and of historical metanarratives, 
what is assumed is both a logic of society available to 
scientific apprehension, and a politics that directly issues from 
this apprehension. Yet .in this reproach, the critique of Marxist 
formulations of power that poststructuralism advances is never 
addressed: the question of what generates power, where or 
whether it is held, and how it moves, goes unanswered in these 
debates. In the interest of bringing this debate more squarely 
in line with the terms that organize it, and to substitute 
argument for denunciation, I propose to reconsider the logics of 
power in Marx's work. 
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Marx discerned power underneath the cloak of metaphysics-- 
idealist philosophy and classical political economy--that kept it 
from view, and at the same time recloaked power with his own 
materialist metaphysics. Marx's brilliance as a critic was to 
track power where others saw'contingency or fate, to supplant the 
magic of a history propelled by ideas with an articulation of 
processes that actually had the capacity to move things. But in 
these dynamics of history--from class struggle to fetters on the 
mode of production--elements persist of a Hegelian logic of 
history, including dialectics, contradictions, progress, unitary 
forces and aims. Mamls project of demystifying history thus 
inaugurates a new mystery even as this mystery is anointed in the 
secular tonalities of science. Marx1s endeavor of 
demystification itself tells a story about power that 
aestheticizes it;this aestheticization is disguised by the claim 
to scientific transparency, by the conceit of science's non- 
ideological character. 
This essay extends Marx's own project of demystification of 
the discourses of power, while recognizing that this 
demystification will not, as Marx hoped, resolve into a new, 
transparent and objective discourse, but rather, can only reveal 
some of the operations of truth in the discourses claiming such a 
title. The essay aims Marx1s critique of metaphysical logics of 
power at the logics of power in Marx, in part to question more 
generally whether power has a logic or logics, in part to ask 
whether Marx sustains logics or whether they falter, in part to 
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ask whether he achieves the distinction he seeks between power 
and critique. Does power move along logical tracks, such as 
those mapped by discourses of contradiction and dialectics, and 
by formulas of exploitation and obfuscation? Are these logics 
tantamount to discursive frames or epistemes, are they orders of 
norms and deviations, or is something more physical, indeed 
causal, implied by the notion of logic and/or the notion of 
power? Moreover, if power does not have a logical structure or 
move according to logical sequences, how might power be thought 
and theorized in a different mein and vein? To what extent does 
M a m  hint in this direction? Where does his own thought exceed 
and contravene his effort to discern power in scientifically 
mappable formulas? Finally, what are the generative powers of 
mystification, and how does Marx himself partake of these powers? 
The problem of logics of power in Marx differs to some 
degree from the problem of his scientism, the latter perhaps 
exhaustively explored'by the debates pursuant to Althusserls 
critique of Marxist humanism. Those debates centered on the 
question of what kind of theory of society and politics he 
authored, e . g. , scientific (Althusserl-, praxis-based (Gramsci) , 
or humanist (Schmidt). Those debates.also very much turned on 
the question of how Ca~ital is to be read in relation to Man's 
more expressly Hegelian period, e-g., Althusser sunders the two 
I8periods8l sharply while Schmidt relates them. But the question 
of logics of power in Marx is a question of ontology that is 
meant to precede questions of epistemology, a question about how 
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the world works not yet concerned with the question of how we may 
apprehend it. Thus, the question of logics of power may be said 
to be conceptually prior to (albeit practically inseparable from) 
the science question insofar as the claim to discern the world 
through scienti'fic method depends upon it partaking of the 
orderliness and lawfulness presumed to organize the natural 
world, the world on which science's validity is premised. 
i 
Across the whole of his work, Marx aimed to replace the 
.popular and scholarly preoccupation with political, institutional 
and ideological power, with a focus on what is most often 
translated as "social forces.". Thus Marx1s cognate terms for 
power include not only "laboru and "capital" and but "multiplied 
productive force," "real material lifen and even "the actual 
nature of things." Marx understands all forms of political power 
in inegalitarian orders to be a mediated appropriation of man's 
l'essential powers," that is, social and more specifically, 
productive power. 
For Marx, political power is always derivative, while social 
power is conceived as original and self-generating. "all 
struggles within the State ... are merely the illusory forms in 
which the real struggles of different classes are fought out 
among one another."' Here arises the paradox, Balibar notes, 
that "in order to reassert ... autonomy in politics, meaning the 
self-determination and self-liberation of the people, Marx the 
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radical had to deny the autonomy of the p~litical."~ 
Historically, this denial had the serious implication of 
preventing Marxists from much concern with the political 
institutions constitutive of radical democracy. If there is only 
one kind of human power, and if it gives shape to all human 
associations, then there is little point in tinkering power's 
manifestations rather than its source. Political organization is 
taken to follow social or material organization. "Assume 
particular stages of development in production, commerce and 
consumption, and you will have a corresponding social 
constitution, a corresponding organization of the family, of 
orders or of classes, in a word, a corresponding civil society. 
Assume a particular civil society, and you will get particular 
political conditions which are only the official expression of 
civil society. n3 
Marx understands the sphere of civil society, more 
specifically the sphere of material life, to be the domain of 
power's operation, and conceives a focus on this domain as always 
already a focus on power; "civil society is the true source and 
theatre of all history."* Thus to depict accurately the 
elements and operations of civil society is to depict the 
elements and operations of power. Civil society names the domain 
of power; the social names its ground; man's productive activity 
is its wellspring. A critique of the idealism (manifested in 
state- centered politics as well as Hegelian philosophy) that 
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both covers and apologizes for for power, is its method of 
apprehension. 
Yet in transposing Hegel's dialectic from the realm of 
rationality and the state to the realm of materiality and civil 
society, Marx appropriates a metaphysics of power that retains 
the structure of idealism even as it aims to repudiate its 
content. It is not simply that Marx believed in progressive 
dialectical movement, the power of negation, and so forth, but 
that he conceived power as qenerated through logical entailment 
and as travelling along circuits of logic; power is neither 
random nor incoherent and its effects can be tracked by the logic 
of its generation. Indeed, for Marx, the dynamic and effects, if 
not the material, of power could be said to consist of logical 
entailment. This is as much the case for the formula for 
extracting surplus value specified in the labor theory of value 
as it is for the logic of alienation in labor articulated in 
commodity fetishism, and the logic of the camera obscura 
constitutive of ideology in class society. But if power is 
produced out of logical entailment, it means that logic itself 
generates power, thereby calling into question power's "materialn 
content at the very moment and through the very theory by which 
this content is asserted. It means further that Marx's own 
critique cannot escape its implication in power, since it is a 
critique that depends on logical entailment and hence forms a 
chain of power, replete with the elements of mystification that 
Marx insists are an inherent dimension of power undemocratically 
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distributed. Put another way, if power is generated out of 
logical entailment, the logics Marx brings to the apprehension of 
power do not simply read power but generate it. If logic is 
generative, if it produces, then it never simply describes, which 
undermines not only the premise of Marx1s scientific critique 'of 
power but the attempt to distance that critique from its object 
of apprehension. Science will emerge not as an account of power 
from the outside but a discourse of power which passes as an 
external account, and in this passing mystifies both its 
imbrication with power and power as such. Science, and the 
logics constitutive of it, will turn out to be a source of 
mystification rather than a solvent of it. 
On the other hand, what if power does not operate logically 
or exceeds or escapes the logics generating it? Indeed, why 
should the material of power in the human world be logic? Why 
should power follow a logical course and what is our investment, 
as moderns, in the idea that it does so? Why should power 
produce order as opposed to anarchy in the human world? Even if 
.power maximizes itself through regularity and systems, through 
the production of routine and calculable effects, why should it 
be the nature of power to maximize itself? What would give power 
this aim or this capacity? Even if power turns out to have a 
physicalist dimension which allows it to follow natural 
.(physical) laws of movement and reaction in space, what would 
.also give it a teleological or temporal dimension? What would 
tether it to purpose and aim in history, what would give it 
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purpose and aim of its own? And above all, what would serve to 
unite this physicalist (spatial) and historical (temporal) 
dimension in a common project? Indeed, in ascribing to power the 
kind of ontological independence and anthropomorphic ambition 
that logic does, is it possible that Marx ascribed to power a 
source and form independent of human beings--a natural or 
physicalist constitution'bound to a divine aim--even as he strove 
to ground both power and history in human activity? At the 
moment he sought to return history to man, did he return it to a 
metahistorical content and course structured by a conception of 
power's relative autonomy from its human generators? In order to 
pursue this question, we must first consider the several logics 
of power Marx specifies as constitutive of modern societies. 5 
Those who would understand the secret of capitalist 
accumulation, Marx argues, must turn their attention from the 
realm of exchange, where both the classical political economists 
and popular belief are focused, to the realm of production, a 
less studied and less accessible place.6 In this, M a n  endorses 
an ancient distinction between appearance and reality in human 
affairs, and endorses as well their respective correspondence to 
surface and depth, popular opinion and philosophical truth, 
accessibility and relative opacity. This insistence on the 
importance of descending beneath appearances to find the truth 
they mask articulates as well both the fundamental move of Marx's 
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philosophical criticism and its putative scientific basis: "all 
science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the 
essence of things directly coincided."' 
Marx characterizes as ideological and obfuscating the domain 
figured as the real in legitimizing discourses: the realm of the 
state, the realm of ideas, the realm of exchange. Conversely, he 
designates as real those realms ordinarily ignored (and 
considered unpolitical) in theory as well as everyday belief: 
civil society, materiality, and production. He not only locates 
significance in what has been disavowed, but spies the apparatus 
of disavowal in what has been valorized. ("It should not astonish 
us," he remarks about classical economic theory, "that vulgar 
economy feels particular at home in the estranged outward 
appearnaces of economic relations ... and that these relations seem 
the more self-evident the more their internal relationships are 
concealed from it. . . ) * Discernible here is a proto- 
deconstructive impulse in Marx's reversal and displacement of the 
dualistic constructs (inherited from Hegel and the classical 
political economists) that he submits to analogical analysis: 
state/civil society, idealism/materialism, exchange/production. 
Each dualism is understood to conceal not only the "real order of 
thingsu but the terms of production--the dynamic of power--of 
that order and to exist on the basis of that concealment. As he 
puts the matter in 
... we therefore take leave for a time of this noisy 
sphere, where everything takes place on the surface and 
in view of all men, and [go] into the hidden abode of 
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production, on whose threshold there stares us in the 
face "No admittance except on busine~s.~ Here we shall 
see, not only how capital produces, but how capital is 
produced. We shall at last force the secret of profit 
makinq. 9 
Significant here less the problematic philosophical conceit 
an essential truth that lies beneath deceptive appearances than 
the logic of power that such a conceit expresses. In Marx1s 
account, power always operates behind a veil and always throws up 
a surface "in view of all menn that distracts us from its abode; 
power produces its mystification, and an order of mystification 
in daily life, as a fundamental rather than incidental product. 
This "perversion of reality," Marx suggests, is present in all 
forms of society that feature commodity-production and money 
circulation, but it is nowhere more precisely expressed than 
under conditions of capitalist production.1° Because power 
produces its own camouflage and structure of legitimation when it 
is distributed undemocratically and because capitalism represents 
the extreme of this undemocratic distribution in its division of 
society into "two great classes opposing one anothern, the 
"secretl1 of capitalist power (profit making) must be "forcedn 
through critical analysis that can reverse the reversals with 
which power covers itself. Above all, this requires grasping 
both subjects and objects of power as effects of power, as 
fabricated by power. 
But if subjects and objects of power are always the effects 
of power, we might ask, why should this cease to be the case when 
power is no longer maldistributed, when it is shared between 
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rather than held by subjects? This is the point at which power 
is figured as legitimate and transparent by Marx, as no longer 
requiring dissimulation. It is also the point at which subjects 
are understood as recovering an essential nature prior to power. 
In this sense, they are figured by Marx as no longer the effects 
of power; a certain organization of power is a condition of this 
recovered nature but it is not constitutive of the subjects 
themselves. Thus, at the very point at which subjects are seen 
to have fully reclaimed their social powers as their.own, power 
ceases to produce and organize them as subjects. Put a different 
way, subjects are returned to themselves simultaneously with 
rejoining them to one another but this return and rejoining are 
precisely a return to authenticity (unalienated species being and 
true community) that excludes or evicts power. 
All-round dependence, this natural form of the world- 
historical co-operation of individuals, will be 
transformed by this communist revolution into the 
control and conscious mastery of these powers, which, 
born of the action of men on one another, have till now 
overawed and governed men as powers completely alien to 
them.'' 
Presumably a power fully mastered is a power no longer--hence its 
transparency as well as its impotence in controlling men's lives. 
Thus power would appear to evaporate at the moment that it is 
collectively grasped, at the moment that its historic 
maldistribution is rectified. And subjects appear to cease being 
produced by power, organized by power, positioned by power, and 
above all, mystified by power at the moment that they share in it 
equally. But if power is only power when it is not shared, and 
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hence when it is not transparent, we are faced with two 
possibilities. Either Marx, as Foucault implies, offers us a 
scene of emancipation that is beyond and outside of power, a 
picture that is otherworldly in the extreme, a picture that 
partakes of the very religious logic Marx sought to reject in his 
break with Hegel. Or, in the exhaustive abolition of ownership 
required in Marx1s formulation of power shared equally, there is 
an implicit confession that power cannot be shared, that 
democracy is impossible precisely because power resists equal 
distribution, indeed, resists equality as such. Is there., in 
other words, a recognition that power shared is no longer power, 
that the only way to capture power collectively is to deprive 
everyone of it?12 Can "actually'existing communismn be 
compassionately understood as impaled on this problem, on the 
mistaken belief that power can be vanquished from human society? 
If power is undemocratic by nature according to Marx, it is 
also unknowable insofar as it always and necessarily disguises 
itself. Here, let us make a return to the passage, cited 
earlier, in which Marx promises to discern the nature of capital 
by trespassing the private property line protecting its secret. 
In seeking to discover, in "the hidden abode of production," not 
only "how capital produces, but how capital is produced," Marx 
indicates the double operation of power: its simultaneous 
production of itself as a subject or agent of power, and 
production of an effect outside of itself. The exploitation of 
labor in commodity production, for example, not only produces 
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capital, but the system of capitalism that reproduces all of the 
system's elements. For Marx, power produces its own conditions 
of reproduction and hence its own futurity, although both moments 
of production are necessarily rife with contradiction. As Marx 
puts the matter Cawital, 
Like all its predecessors, the capitalist process of 
production proceeds under definite material conditions, 
which are, however, simultaneously the bearers of 
definite social relations entered into by individuals 
in the process of reproducing their life. Those 
conditions, like these relations, are on the one hand 
prerequisites and on the other hand results and 
creations of the capitalist process of production; they 
are produced and reproduced by it.13 
.But how power could achieve such a feat--producing both its 
necessary prerequisites and its intended effects--without having 
divine or naturalistic dimensions, a metaphysical structure and a 
teleological course? And what would give humanly generated power 
these characteristics? Why should power know where it is going 
if those generating it, produced by it, steeped in it, are 
largely clueless? What imagine of God's prescience and human 
blindness shapes this putative secu'larization of history? 
Indeed, Marx would appear to be positing a metaphysical outside 
to human social and historical existence, a metaphysical outside 
that, again, is eliminated at the moment that human beings 
acquire control of their own existence, acquire freedom--a 
freedom that now seems to entail emancipation from 
metaphysics. 14 
The formulas for exploitation and accumulation that Marx 
discovered in the "hidden abode of productionn are primarily 
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expressed in the labor theory of value, but involve the logic of 
commodity fetishism and alienation as well. Marx extends and 
revises Adam Smith's labor theory of value relatively modestly, 
but sufficiently to replace the "hidden handu and "free exchangew 
with a theory of the systematic exploitation and inequality at 
the heart of capitalist accumulation. Capital is formed out of 
surplus labor, that is, labor performed over and above what is 
necessary to reproduce the worker: extracted systematically 
through a combination of lengthening of the working day 
(increasing the amount of labor power extracted) and 
technological developments (reducing the proportion of labor 
required to reproduce the worker), surplus labor is "realized" 
through the exchange of commodities on the market. "Capital is 
not sum of the material and produced means of production. 
Capital is rather.the means of production transformed into 
capital. . . "I5 
A host of contradictions accompany the process of producing 
and realizing capital--from degrees of exploitation that destroy 
workers to suppression of purchasing power and investment through 
the containment of wages--but such contradictions only serve as 
affirmations of the logics themselves. Indeed, the 
contradictions operate as proof of the systematic nature of the 
process Marx maps insofar as they affirm the bounded nature of 
that process. Just as the unevenness of historical development 
consequent to dialectical materialism confirms rather than 
undermines the notion of progress in history, the contradictions 
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attendant upon capitalist production and realization confirm 
rather than undermine the systematic nature of the process. 
The specific power in the economic process--that which 
"produces capitalu as well as that which is "produced by itu is, 
of course, labor converted into labor power, labor that is first 
commodified and then purchased, wielded, and exploited by 
capital. Labor is converted into commodity form by removing its 
capacity to provide for itself, that is, by the ubiquity and 
dominance of capital as an economic form. Historically, this 
conversion is achieved through the enclosure movements and other 
social processes that proletarianize workers, depriving them of 
access to the means of production. Proletarianization is itself 
the outcome of a certain logic of history, in which'the 
bourgeoisie is generated out of the fetters on late feudal 
production, and in which the bourgeoisie in turn configures labor 
in a shape necessary for the realization of its economic and 
political ambitions. For such realization to occur, what is 
required is the production of a class that Marx ironically calls 
"freen in the double sense of being free of the capacity to 
produce its own subsistence and free to sell its labor power on 
the open market, that is, free from feudal social or political 
constraints on its movement. Generation of a class with this 
double freedom, and of a propertied bourgeoisie, in turn 
necessitates political transformation of an order in which 
neither property nor labor could circulate freely: it requires 
that a liberal constitutional order be brought into being, one 
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that secures both universal property rights, including property 
in oneself, and bourgeois liberties of movement. Thus, the logic 
of capitalist accumulation in the exploitation of free labor 
entails the Age of Revolution that bears forth the conditions of 
such accumulation. 
iii 
This brief sketch of the major elements of capitalist 
production suggests that the logics of power constitutive of 
Marx1s political economy form a lengthy interlocking chain in 
which each element is hinged to a presupposition that is itself 
another vital element in the chain. On a literal level, "capital 
is dead labor that, vampire-like, only lives by sucking living 
labor, and lives the more, the more labor it sucks."16 
However, this paradoxical vampire logic in which the dead "livesu 
by sucking life from the living can only transpire within a 
complex logic of history in which capital is born out of 
contradictions in feudal production on the one side, and 
generates its "own gravediggersn on the other. Political economy 
has internal, swatiallv organized logics of power that generate 
capital, class, exploitation, commodification, fetishism, and so 
forth. But political economy is also ordered by temworal logics 
such as those expressed by the terms contradiction, fetter, and 
development, those logics comprising Marx1s philosophy of 
history. "Class strugglen is an instance of both: as that which 
animates political economy in time, it is also that which opposes 
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the pure temporality of the Hegelian dialectic--it carries the 
spatial dimension that materialism installs in the dialectical 
progress of history. Yet the spatial and temporal logics also 
presuppose one another, and in this way cloak the workings of 
power precisely where it is meant to be exposed. Put another 
way, there is a curious shell game at work in Marx1s schemes of 
logical entailment: in a series. of effects, each of which comes 
on the heels of and generates another, where is the animating 
dynamic in the series; that is, where is power? To the extent 
that. power .is not a material substance but a relation, is it 
inevitable that bringing it literally into view would be 
impossible, even and especially in a materialist analytic frame? 
Or is this failure the consequence of a form of critique that 
hinges power to logic, and its circularities, rather than to a 
domain and mechanics of uncapturability, relationality, and 
contingency? 
The problematic of alienation may provide a means of 
addressing these questions. For Marx, alienation results from a 
certain form of organization of labor and economic distribution 
and not, as Hegel insisted, from labor as such as an activity of 
"externalization." In this as in many other instances, Marx 
recasts Hegel1s (eternal) anthropological verity as an 
historically specific production. In capitalist commodity 
production, commodities acquire a socially oppressive existence 
and are elements of an economic and social order that is 
oppressive and exploitative: they come to have a power "over and 
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against manw that is both drawn from and constitutive of the 
power of capital itself. 
Marx makes alienation tell the story of labor that is 
congealed in an object "foreignn to the worker--produced neither 
from his intellectual conception nor under his direction and 
control. "...estrangement is manifested not only in the result 
but in the act of wroduction--within the producins activitv 
itself.1117 But Marx also makes alienation tell the story of 
man's psychic estrangement,from a human universe not under his 
control but in which he dwells. In this, Marx employs the notion 
of alienation to signal a simultaneously psychic and economic 
effect, each of which conditions the other. In using alienation 
to signify a double effect of estranged labor--exploitation and 
psychic disorientation--Man is attempting to forge an analytic 
link between economy and psyche, between mode of production and 
habitus, that exceeds what is ordinarily conveyed by formulations 
of the relation between material life and consciousness. The 
recognition that -appropriation of man's labor in capitalist 
commodity production produces a lived experience of alienation 
(and not merely alienation of his labor) is a recognition that 
the economic produces the subject not simply as an objective 
member of a class but as subjectivity. How else to read Marx's 
evocative lament, 
The worker therefore only feels himself outside his 
work, and in his work feels outside himself. He is at 
home when he is not working, and when he is working he 
is not at home .... Just as in religion the spontaneous 
activity of the human imagination, of the human brain 
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.and the human heart ... operates on him as an alien, 
divine or diabolical activity--in the same way the 
worker's activity is not his spontaneous activity. It 
belongs to another; it is the loss of his self. As a 
result . . .  man...no longer feels himself to be freely 
active in any but his animal functions ... and in his 
human functions he no longer feels himself to be 
anything but an animal. What is animal becomes human 
and what is human becomes animal.18 
This passage suggests that the economic is productive of and co- 
terminus with the non-economic, that labor is always more than 
labor, and the material is always already more than the material. 
In fact, there would appear to be a formulation of power here 
that exceeds the vocabulary Marx has for describing it since the 
psychic formation he hints at is at least as complex as the 
process of production he maps. Had Marx had access to or 
developed such a vocabulary, however, the logics of power he 
asserts might well have unravelled, for the reverberation of 
power between psyche and economy would likely have undone any 
logical relation as their dynamic produced something far less 
general, predictable, and in any event less progressive. 
Alienated workers can strike, subvert, or even seize the 
apparatus of production, but what of alienated psyches? 
Even within Marx1s terms, however, it should be evident that 
to designate Marx1s formulation of power in production as an 
economic or commodity model of power, as Foucault does, is to 
vastly reduce the complexity of Marx1s understanding of the 
effects of commodified, appropriated, and alienated labor. 2 0 
While the precipitating moment in this process is the reduction 
of labor to the commodity, labor-power, and the alienation of 
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that commodity from its owner, even this moment is compounded 
from a much denser oweration of power: the commodity is itself 
achieved through alienation and the latter is a simultaneously 
physical and psychic operation, neither element of which exists 
without the other. Put the other around, alienation is itself 
the prior condition of the production of the commodity insofar as 
it is the condition of commodity fetishism and of the procurement 
of labor-power by the capitalist. 
Moreover, the logic of power Marx traces in the o~eration of 
the commodity is, by his own admission, not a tangible but a 
nmysticaln one, "at the same time perceptible and imperceptible 
by the senses.m21 As he puts the matter in Ca~ital, "the 
existence of things commodities, and the value-relation 
between the products of labor which stamps them as commodities., 
have absolutely no connexion with their physical properties and 
with the material relations arising therefrom.~~~ In short, 
Marx treats this kind of power neither as a commodity nor as a 
material force but as constituted by ideology or what is here 
denoted as fetishism. Pace Foucault, Marx does not figure power 
as a commodity but precisely, as a relation that comes to assume 
commodity form, which is, crucially, the form in which the nature 
of power is mystified. 23 
While commodity fetishism is an inevitable feature of the 
capitalist mode of production, while it is an effect of that mode 
of production, it is also a prerequisite to such production: If 
commodities were not fetishized, capitalist production would not 
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be possible. "This I call the Fetishism which attaches itself to 
the products of labor, so soon as they are produced as 
commodities, and which is therefore inse~arable from the 
production of commodities. lf2' Capitalist exchange requires 
mutual exchangeability of goods, that is, the universal emphasis 
on exchange value over use value that can only occur when all 
commodities are fetishized. Neither the elements of production 
(labor), nor the elements of exchange (commodities) nor the 
currency of exchange (money) could be mobilized without being 
fetishized. In this regard, the phenomenon of the fetish, a 
mystical phenomenon, is not only the inevitable effect of 
a .  
capitalist production, a material process, but is what enables 
that process. Both cause and consequence, prerequisite and 
effect, the strange logic of the fetish in Marx appears more 
\ paradoxical than even its psychoanalytic cousin whose essential 
formula, "1 know, but still . . . "  conveys an undulation inherent in 
the working of power, an inability to be fully captured by 
structure or formula because power must move and dissimulate in 
order to persist. Never linear or sequential, yet essential to 
the material production of material things, Marx acknowledges 
that, notwithstanding all of its material effects, the fetish can 
be apprehended only through "recourse to the mist-enveloped 
regions of the religious 
It might even be said that the fetish is the consummate form 
of power in Marx insofar as it mystifies and materializes in the 
same gesture, insofar as it crystalizes the necessity and 
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inevitability of mystification for materialization. Indeed, if 
fetishism is that process whereby power as a relation is obscured 
through reification, through the guise of an object, then what 
Marx calls material life, with all of its objective, tangible, 
and concrete character, is always already fetishized. The fetish 
exemplifies mystification as a mechanism in the production of 
power as material currency, the power of the commodity, and the 
power of capital. The fetish is an o~eration of power in a logic 
that defies both agency and physicality even as it participates 
in both, is constitutive of both. The notion of power 
transpiring as an operation is a crucial component of the larger 
schema of power that Marx maps insofar as it marks the spatial 
dimension of power for Marx, its production outside of a temporal 
logic of development and contradiction. This suggests again the 
misfire of Foucault's critique of Marxism as proffering a notion 
of power reducible to "economic f~nctionality."~~ 
Commodity fetishism is a necessary and inevitable emotional- 
psychic configuration of capitalism. It is necessary because it 
binds humans to capitalist production and mystifies both the 
production process and the bind. It is inevitable because "the 
life process of societyn--the dead labor congealed in the 
commodity--is inherently veiled in an inegalitarian and alienated 
order. "The 1ife.process of society, which is based on the 
process of material production, does not strip off its mystical 
veil until it is treated as production by freely associated men, 
and is consciously regulated by them in accordance with a settled 
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plan. w 2 7  In short, the logic of commodity fetishism draws upon 
a prior logic in which power is necessarily mystified when it is 
not collectivized, the latter being a moment, as we have seen, 
when power mysteriously vanishes. This set of logical 
entailments is not simply a political mandate but an ontological 
one, and to see it clearly, we must move from Capital (back) to 
The German Ideoloav and "The Jewish Question," and thus from the 
problem of fetishism back to the concept of the camera 
obscura . 2 8 
iv 
If commodity fetishism partakes of "the mist-enveloped 
regions of the religious worldu where "the religious world is but 
the reflex of the real worldu, if it is thus the religious 
coro,llary of alienated production, a brief consideration of 
Marx1s understanding of the logic of religion is in order. More 
than merely the "opium of the peoplen in oppressive regimes, Marx 
regards religious consciousness, like ideology, as simultaneously 
the distortion, the mirror, and the necessarv product of such 
regimes. It is in all three senses that Marx asserts a literal 
as well as figural wconnection of German philosophy [ideology] 
with German reality.~~' Similarly, in Capital, he links the 
alienated world of commodity production with Christianity's 
"cultus of abstract man.n30 
In The German Ideolow, Marx proffers the science of 
ideology that binds together his philosophy of consciousness and 
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his philosophy of history in a tight, linear logic. These links 
are clearest in the famous passage articulating the relationship 
between the activity and the consciousness of men: 
The production of ideas, of conceptions, of 
consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the 
material activity and the material intercourse of men, 
the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the 
mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the 
direct efflux of their material behavior. The same 
applies to mental production as expressed in the 
language of politics, laws, morality, religion, 
metaphysics, etc. of a people. Men are the producers 
of their conceptions, ideas, etc.--real, active men, as 
they are conditioned by a definite development of their 
productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding 
to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can 
never be anything else than conscious existence, and 
the existence of men is their actual life-process. If 
in all ideology men and their circumstances appear 
upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon 
arises just as much from their historical life-process 
as the inversion of objects on the retina does from 
their physical life process. 31 
If what we see, regardless of how distortedly, is what is 
actually in the world, so, too, according to Marx,  consciousness 
can never be anything else than conscious existenceu--it refers 
to the reality of our existence. IExistence1 thus has the same 
objective status as the visual domain apprehended by sight. When 
life is whole, unalienated, and unstratified, Marx argues, the 
material basis of all consciousness is transparent; when life is 
alienated, stratified, and controlled by alien powers, so also 
does consciousness suffer these effects. As he remarks in 
Ca~ital, "the religious reflex of the real world can ... only then 
finally vanish, when the practical relations of every-day life 
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offer to man none but perfectly intelligible and reasonable 
relations with regard to his fellow men and to Nature.1132 
Crucially, however, the relation between alienated 
consciousness and life under alienated conditions is not 
amorphous: with the figure of the camera obscura, Marx precisely 
formulates consciousnessls inversion of reality as well as a 
potential remedy for this inversion that matches the precise 
inversion of images in the retina (and correction of'this 
inversion by the brain) entailed in the process of seeing. For 
Marx, the logic of ideologyls inversion of reality is just as 
.absolute, just as necessary and inevitable, as the retina's 
inversion of reality in sight. In both cases, reality is not 
simply distorted, but precisely inverted, upsidedown. Moreover, 
what appears initially as metaphor or homology between vision and 
consciousness collapses as the contiguity unfolds between the two 
processes he compares. Ideology is not merely comparable to 
vision but is itself about ways of seeing, or more precisely, 
ways of perceptually distorting the world; it is about not seeing 
what is objectively there to be seen because that objective 
there-ness appears to consciousness upsidedown. Ideology is 
defined by the systematic inversion and dissimulation of reality, 
an inversion and dissimulation of both its dynamics and effects. 
Marx1s science of critique promises to correct this inversion 
just as surely and precisely as the brain corrects the retina's 
inverted image. Thus, the figure of the camera obscura (and of 
the brain righting the image that the retina inverts) is not 
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simply a figure but a physical formula both for the production of 
distortion in inegalitarian orders and for the brain's capacity 
to correct this distortion. In the case of vision, the brain is 
programmed to reverse the retina's inversion; in the case of 
ideology, the brain requires.socia1 science for this reversal. 
Here, in an almost parodic insistence on the logical order of 
things, is the scientific foundation (ideological inversion akin 
to retinal inversion) of scientific critique (systematic reversal 
and displacement of the inversion) of the science of power 
(systematic mystification of unequal social relations). 
Yet, according to Marx, ideology's inversion of reality does 
not only produce metalepsis, but a more general dissembling of 
social dynamics and effects. Thus, for example, in Adam Smith's 
political economy, a "hidden handm is understood to reconcile 
individual and common interests; in Hegel's philosophy of the 
state, the idea of the state and the idea of freedom realize one 
another and "transcendn the unfreedom of civil society. This 
dissembling that exceeds inversion pertains to two crucial 
differences between Marx's understanding of sight and of 
consciousness: first, in consciousness, the brain is not only 
"curativen of distortion but itself produces distortions; and 
second, consciousness apprehends (or conjures) not simply objects 
but dvnamics of social reality, the source and logic of reality's 
movement and direction. Marx identifies both elements in the 
following passage of The German Ideolocrv: 
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In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends 
from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to 
heaven. That is to say, we do.not set out from what 
men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, 
thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at 
men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men, 
and on the basis of their real life-process we 
demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes 
and echoes of this life-process. The phantoms formed 
in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of 
their material life-process, which is empirically 
verifiable and bound to material premises. 33 
Marx locates the initial production of ideology in the 
historically achieved division between mental and manual labor, a 
division that permits consciousness to "flatter itself that it is 
- .  .. . 
something other than consciousness of existing practicen but that 
-- 
A- 
also signals a social division of labor that founds class 
.- 
society, and hence the existence of structured ineq~ality.~~ 
The character of this founding moment suggests that ideology is 
C . .  - 
born both out of a logical need for mystification--the need to 
,. . 
legitimate exploitation and inequality--and out of a logical 
ground for it--the splitting off of thought from material 
production, the sundering of what was originally whole. There 
is, in this regard, a religious logic at work in Marx's own 
thinking: 'In the beginning ... we were one, whole, and lived in 
Truth . . . I  Truth, communism, authenticity, and transparency are 
made to coincide at the beginning and the end of history. 
In this splitting of manual and mental labor, ideology not 
only becomes necessary but possible, since this is the splitting 
that disembodies consciousness, separating it from bodily 
existence and experience, as the eye might be separated from the 
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brain. And it is here that Marx would seem to posit a very 
nearly primary alienation rather than one specific to capitalism: 
man does not experience the world "authenticallyn or accurately 
when he does not experience the whole of human activity in his 
own activity, when his activity is a fragment of a larger social 
order rather than a microcosm of it. Hence Marx's argument that 
"the life process of society . . .  does not strip off its mystical 
veil until it is treated as production by freely associated men 
and is consciously regulated by them in accordance with a settled 
plan.m35 The religious logic in which man's original wholeness 
is now recovered through a rationally achieved and sustained 
unity with other men allows Marx to fantasize an overcoming of 
the (generative) element of mystification in power. It is an 
image of power transparent, self-revealing, harmless, and fully 
within the control of those in its field-- in short, not an image 
of power at all. At the culmination of the logic of history, 
power'itself dissolves; or, as the matter has been more commonly 
formulated, history itself ends with the realization of true 
communism. History as contingency and conditions thwarting 
particular intention gives way to (a fantastic picture of) life 
executed according to a deliberate plan. This is an unhistorical 
life not simply because the logics of political economy, 
ideology, and so forth have come to an end, but because the frame 
of this life is no longer conceived of as external to the humans 
living it: our control if life conditions is, potentially, 
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absolute. Thus, it is not only that conditions are transparent, 
they are no longer determinant of our possibilities. 36 
The division between mental and manual labor undergirds the 
logic of ideology's inversion of reality in another way as well. 
The division itself sunders the ideational from the material 
world, consciousness from existence, and so renders that 
separation as a commonplace that becomes common-sensical. The 
division of mental and manual labor, in other words, becomes the 
basis on which consciousness (and philosophy, religion, etc.) 
"flatters itself that it has an independent existence." This 
division, in short, aenerates the splitting off of consciousness 
that in turn generates "independentu intellectual life-- 
philosophy and religion, but also science. Moreover, the 
domination in the relation articulated by the division is 
expressed through the autonomy of mental labor as a natural 
rather than a conventional effect. In this way, the division 
between manual and mental labor appears as both the prerequisite 
to and ongoing condition of an ideological construction of an 
inegalitarian social order. Ideology represents the perspective 
of mental labor that does not grasp its participation and 
location in a division of labor, tantamount to a mind that does 
not grasp its lodging in a body and a history, which is for Marx, 
precisely the condition of the philosophical mind. Thus do 
ideology and philosophy necessarily, rather than accidentally, 
coincide. 
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Put differently, when mental labor is separated from manual 
labor, its idealist conceit about the constituent elements and 
order of social life is not entirely wrong from the perspective 
it inhabits. The ruling class sees the world from the 
perspective of its disembodiment--its separation from its own 
bodies as well as from the social body of production. Marx 
phrases the political effect of this in a famous passage: 
the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the 
ruling ideas ... the ruling ideas are nothing more than 
the ideal expression of the dominant material . 
relations, the dominant material relationships grasped 
as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one 
class the ruling one, therefore the ideas of 
dominance. 3 7 
In sum, there is a strict convergence between disembodied 
consciousness, a social position of domination, and the very 
production of idealist thought and philosophy. But this 
convergence, which is an effect of the division of labor, is also 
generative: 
Once the ruling ideas have been separated from the 
ruling individuals and, above all, from the 
relationships which result from a given stage of the 
mode of production, and in this way the conclusion has 
been reached that history is always under the sway of 
ideas, it is very easy to abstract from these various 
ideas "the idea,." the notion, etc. as the dominant 
force in history and thus to understand all these 
separate ideas and concepts as "forms of self- 
determinationn on the part of - concept developing in 
history. 38 
The belief that ideas have dynamic and trajectory of their 
is the inevitable outcome of an order in which the "realu 
elements of material life are disguised, and in which 
own 
consciousness is regarded as a wellspring rather than an effect 
I 
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of history. ll... [Alccording to their fantasy, the relationships 
of men, all their doings, their chains and their limitations are 
products of their consciousness...n39 
Idealist philosophy is not only logically entailed by the 
division between manual and mental labor, it assists in 
legitimating that division, and the inegalitarian order it . 
inaugurates, insofar as it undergirds an ideological formulation 
of the state. Again, what appears at first as a homological 
relation emerges as a chain of power relations. It is not merely 
that idealism is to materialism as the state is to civil society 
(and heaven is to earth) in a structural sense, .although Marx 
does make that argument. Rather, for him, the state's occupation 
of the space of political life in modernity is a specifically 
idealist conceit, predicated on the illusion that ideas or 
principles concerning liberty and equality are the site of 
enactment of these principles. The equation of the state with 
the political is further premised on the notion that values such 
as equality and liberty are secured through abstraction from the 
concrete dimensions and activities of social life, through 
removal from the (material) orders of life constitutive of its 
lived particularity. The universalist reach of the state, and of 
idealist claims about "man, " "freed~rn,~ and so forth, are thus 
both a consequence of and legitimation for the division of mental 
and manual labor in class society. In the wake of this division, 
consciousness not only fantasizes its independence but its 
universal status--in part because it imagines its thoughts to be 
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independent of any body, time, or lived situation and in part 
because universalism is the necessary political claim of a class 
contesting for hegemony. "For each new class which puts itself 
in the place of one ruling before it, is compelled . . .  to represent 
its interest as the common interest of all the members of 
society, that is expressed in ideal form: it has to give its 
ideas the form of universality 
Yet another respect in which the division of mental and 
manual labor and of ideas from material life entails rather than 
simply corresponds to an ideological formulation of state and 
civil society brings us closer to Marxts argument that the state 
as such is a product of the conflict between individual and 
community in inegalitarian orders. According to Marxts critique 
of Hegel, this is the conflict that is masked by the production 
of the state as the universal representative and as such, as the 
representation of community, a domain where harmony as well as 
freedom and equality can be said to prevail, and where the 
conflicts, unf reedoms , and inegalitarianism of civil society 
be reconciled or discounted as comparatively insubstantial. 
... out' of this very contradiction between the interest 
of the individual and that of the community, the latter 
takes an independent form as the State, divorced from 
the real interests of individual and community, and at 
the same time as an illusory communal life, always 
based, however, on real ties existing in every family 
and tribal conglomeration ... and ... on the 
classes ... which in every such mass of men separate out 
and of which one dominates all the others.. . 
can 
It follows from this that all struggles within the 
State. ..are merely the illusory forms in which the real 
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struggles of the different classes are fought out among 
one another.. . "41 
In casting the state as an illusow domain of both politics and 
community, Ma- would seem to be figuring the state as more than 
simply a mystification of them but as the site of their 
displacement or postponement. In other words, the mere presence 
of the state signals the absence of community and the 
displacement of "real strugglesN among groups to a distorting but 
also limiting venue, a venue where they cannot be resolved. The 
state emerges in response to the contradiction between the 
interest of the individual and the community produced by the 
social division of labor; thus, some version of the state and its 
dissimulation of political life emerges under any conditions of 
inequality. While individuals experience their civil relations 
primarily through the idiom individualistic con£ lict, 
capitalist relations of production situate them in relations of 
interdependence. This contradiction, in which subjects are 
caught simultaneously in relations of enmity and dependency, is 
smoothed ideologically by economic theories of the hidden hand, 
political theories of the benefits of interest group conflict, 
and philosophies of utilitarianism, each of which converts 
competitive self-interest into the common good. Marx, however, 
regards this contradiction as not only inherent to capitalism but 
as at the root of both the ideology of the political sphere as 
the domain of community, and the production of bourgeois 
individualism in the sphere of civil society. The state 
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represents the illusion of universal representation and of 
reconciliation of antagonistic civil interests. 
In the "Critique of Hegel1s Philosophy of Rightn and the "On 
the Jewish Question," Marx argues that the state is only 
necessary because of conflict in civil society; the state 
presupposes rather than abolishes or resolves that conflict. 
Without the existence of such conflict, the state would have no 
raison dletre. ,"Far from abolishing [the] effective differences 
[among individuals in civil society], the state only exists so 
far as they are presupposed.1142 State legitimacy is rooted in 
the logic of ideology that reverses this presupposition, the 
logic that figures the state's universality as prior to rather 
than dependent upon civil conflict. Yet this nillusionn is 
itself generative of state power and a certain form of political 
life, a power and a form which cannot be undone by puncturing the 
illusion on which it is based. For just as commodity fetishism 
and alienation cause "man's own deed to become an alien power 
opposed to himu in civil society, so does the power of the state 
rest on the displacement (from civil society to the state) of 
irreconciliable conflicts in civil society. This displacement of 
politics and postponement of universalism and community is not 
reversible but rather, is generative of the powerful institutions 
of the state as well as of the "depoliticized" character of civil 
society. The legitimacy of capitalism depends upon it being 
unpolitical; the legitimacy of the state depends upon it 
appearing to have nothing to do with capitalism or other media of 
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social conflict. The legitimacy of both depends upon the logic 
of inversion constitutive of ideology in inegalitarian orders, in 
short, upon the logic of power in ideology itself. 
The logic of ideology traced thus far does not conclude with 
the illusory form of community provided by the state in alienated 
civil society. Marx moves next to show how the state/civil 
society relation mirrors, requires, and reproduces the 
relationship between heaven and earth in Christianity, and why 
Christianity is therefore the necessary rather than historically 
contingent religion of the modern state. The most succinct 
account of this mirroring occurs in "The Jewish Questionn 
immediately following the passage in which Marx explains the 
fundamental mechanism of the liberal state discussed above, its 
presupposition of the very social powers (property, social rank, 
etc.) that it claims to overcome through their political 
abolition, its entrenchment in civil society of the particular 
elements that its universalism claims to transcend. On the heels 
of this claim, Marx writes: 
All the presuppositions of this egoistic life continue 
to exist in civil societv outside the political sphere, 
as qualities of civil society. Where the political 
state has attained to its full development, man leads, 
not only in thought, in consciousness, but in reality, 
in life, a double existence--celestial and terrestrial. 
He lives in the political communitv, where he regards 
himself as a communal beinq, and in civil societv where 
he acts simply as a private individual, treats other 
men as means, degrades himself to the role of a mere 
means, and becomes the plaything of alien powers. The 
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political state, in relation to civil society, is just 
as spiritual as is heaven in relation to earth. It 
stands in the same opposition to civil society, and 
overcomes it in the same manner as religion overcomes 
the narrowness of the profane world, i.e., it has 
always to acknowledge it again, re-establish it, and 
allow itself to be dominated by it.43 
Again, we need to ask whether the relation Marx ascribes to 
religion and the structure of a modern political order is a 
homological, analogical, or causal one. Does political life 
realize a certain religious formation? Is it more accurately 
understood occasioned by this formation? fact, Marx here 
surrenders the relatively simple notion of the camera obscura, in 
which ideology the inversion material reality, for a more 
complex and less easily metaphorized understanding of the subset 
of ideology that is religious consciousness. For religion does 
not merely invert material conditions but expresses elements.of ' 
it, such as the separation of man "from himself and from other 
men. 1144 In this vein, Marx describes political emancipation 
from religion (the formal secularism of the state and 
citizenship) as the moment in which religion ceases to be the 
"spirit of the stateu and becomes instead "the spirit of civil 
society, of the sphere of egoism and of the bellum omnium contra 
omnes . It has become ... an expression of the fact that man 
separated from the communitv, from himself and other menSn4' 
Religion thus symptomatically emresses a certain experience, 
both emotional and physical in content, and so requires a reading 
attentive to the symptom 'it conveys. In Althusserls formulation, 
in ideology, 
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men do indeed express, not the relation between them and 
their conditions of existence but the wav they live the 
relation between them and their conditions of existence: 
this presupposes both a real relation and an 'imaginaryt, 
'livedt relation ... In ideology, the real relation is 
inevitably invested in the imaginary relation.46 
It is this slide between the "realn relation and "the way the 
relation is lived," this way in which the imaginary "carriesu the 
real relation, that the notion of the camera obscura could not 
capture, and that required a more complex and in some ways less 
rigid precise formulations the mediations entailed in 
ideological expression and functioning. 
For Mam, religious consciousness expresses not only a 
particular relation to existing conditions but, potentially, 
yearnings for a different order. Its fantastic formulations Marx 
reads as a kind of mass utopian political theory. .Just as the 
ideology of universality, freedom, and equality in the liberal 
state signifies the desire for those unrealized values, so the 
Christian precepts of the brotherhood of man or equality in 
heaven represent the unrealized longing for theme4' Or as Marx 
casts the matter with a slightly different emphasis: "just as 
Christ is the intermediary to whom man attributes all his own 
divinity and all his religious bonds, so the state is the 
intermediary to which man confides all his non-divinity and all 
his human freedom.n48 In the figure of the state and of 
Christ, ideology is shown to take very concrete forms: more than 
mere ideas or attachments of consciousness, ideology (mistakenly) 
attributes to the institutions of the church and the state powers 
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that are not their own, powers that are actually human capacities 
and human effects that come to be circuitously invested in church 
and state. But in and through this attribution, power is at the 
same time conferred upon these institutions, thus making the 
attribution at least partly true. Indeed, the power of these 
institutions is largely constituted by these systematic relations 
of misrecognition and misinvestment. From this perspective, the 
Althusserian construal of ideology as a force that is itself 
productive of the subject in its interpellative function appears 
to be far closer to Marx1s own understanding than is often 
conceived.49 Consider this passage from the "Jewish Questionv: 
But the consummation of the idealism of the state was 
at the same time the consummation of the materialism of 
civil society ... The formation of the political state, 
and the dissolution of civil society into independent 
individuals whose relations are regulated by law ... are 
accomplished by one and the same act. Man as a member 
of civil society--non-political man--necessarily 
appears as the natural man ... Egoistic man is the 
passive, given result of the dissolution of 
society. . . 5 0 
Marx here confesses the accomplishment of the state--a 
"celestialu and ideological entity--in dividing man against 
himself, in producing the depoliticization of civil society 
("dissolving civil society into its elementsn), in short, in 
bringing about the very political order and political subject 
that renders ideology as power. This same confession, however, 
undermines the notion of power as generative only in its strictly 
material form. Indeed, it undermines the claim that civil 
society alone is the "theatre of all history." 
Brown, Logics of Power in Marx 39 
Although Marx does not made the argument himself, the state 
could be said to be fetishized much as commodities are, and to 
follow a similar logic of power and power's disguise. For the 
state, too, embodies "a definite social relation between men that 
assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between 
thingsn where the things at issue are institutions such as law 
and parliaments. 51 In this case, however, it is not human 
labor power but human political potential and political yearnings 
that are reified and refracted in state institutions. And these 
elements--potential and yearnings--cannot be commodified in the 
same way labor can, precisely because of their intangible 
dimensions, their =-definite quality. Hence Marxts alternative 
phraseology: Referring to the state as the "intermediary between 
man and human libertyn and Christ as the "intermediary to whom 
man attributes all his own divinity and his religious bonds," 
Marx concludes, "the state is the intermediary to which man 
confides all his non-divinity and all his human freed0m.1~~~ 
Marx1s language here--that of "attributingt1 and "confidingn 
(verleaen--to transfer in the sense of mislaying or misplacing)-- 
is a language quite different from that of exploiting, 
extracting, and expropriating. In attributing and confiding 
freedom and non-divinity to institutions and phantasms, man is 
giving away by mislaying his capaciousness and independence, his 
sensual enjoyment of himself, his powers of self-governance. 
This disavowal or depowerment is not voluntary, of course, but is 
consequent to orders of power (church, state, and economy) that 
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solicit and depend upon it. Regardless of how it is 
accomplished, however, the mislaying does itself become a power, 
a political fact with enormous consequences. Like any fetish, 
the state becomes real through attribution, through psychic and 
social investment. Thus attribution is generative and not simply 
deflective, an admission Marx makes again and again yet cannot 
follow for its implications. Mystification is not simply a cover 
for power but a source of power, a maker of history. 
This brief excursus into the relation between state, 
ideology and civil society suggests that the model as well as the 
logic of power pertinent to the state and religion implicates the 
analysis in the fetishism it criticizes. In its difference from 
the model of power he offers in Capital, it also suggests the 
limits of that model for understanding the economy. Would Marx 
have acknowledged as much had been able to return to the problem 
of the state and ideology in the unfinished part of Capital 
intended to take up these subjects? Would Capital have survived 
the return? 
vi 
Marx's effort to contain power in a critical mode through a 
strict materialist accounting of power is undone by his own 
recognition that the variety of institutions and ideas generated 
by particular modes of production (religion, the state, ideology) 
are themselves locales of power-- generative, creative, capable 
of making history. Power that would be tamed by materialist 
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analysis, rendered logical, predictable, and hydraulic, thus 
resists this taming. Power can no more be distinguished from its 
presentation than it can be separated from its particular 
institutional forms. Notwithstanding Marx's effort to do so, 
power does not bear a constant shape nor does it redound to a 
single source. And it is Marx himself, in his extraordinary 
attunement to the workings of power, who implicitly makes this 
recognition. 
Marx's effort to tame or contain power in a normative mode, 
figured in his fantasy of an order in which power is completely 
negated by being completely shared, in which power emerges 
unadorned because the need for disguised has presumably 
evaporated, is also undone by his own recognition of power's 
unsharability. It is undone as well by Marx's appreciation of 
mys-tification as itself a modality of power. 
The logics of power in Marx do not hold. What are the 
grounds of critique, and of normative visions, that can work free 
of these logics? This is a most serious question for Marxists 
who would seek to lay claim to political relevance. 
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